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	DOCUMENT NO. 17 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DE 21 January 1960 DEGLASS: FIED CLASS. CHANGE: TO: TS S NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010 AUTH: HR 79-2 COPY NO. C 177 DATE: UN 1980 REVIEWER:
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	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN	
	21 January 1960	
25X1	DAULY BRIEF	
	DAILY BRIEF	
	I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC	
25X1	USSR: Nikolay Belyayev, removed as party boss of Soviet Kazakhstan ostensibly for mismanagement in agriculture, may also have lost his membership in the top-ranking all-union party presidium. Belyayev's demotion is in line with several recent indications that Khrushchev, dissatisfied with some of his lieutenants, has been shaking up his staff. He now may find it expedient to bring some new faces into its ranks. (Page 1)	25X1
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25X1	II. ASIA-AFRICA	
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	Approved For Release 2002/07/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004900160001-0	25X1
	South Korea: Syngman Rhee's opponent in presidential elections this spring, Cho Pyong-ok of the opposition Democratic party, has decided not to campaign. 25X6 The Democratic vice-presidential candidate, incumbent Chang Myon, could become the party presidential candidate if Cho withdraws. However, he may remain in second place	25X1
25X1	in the belief that he would win again against Assembly Speaker Yi Ki-pung and thus have a better chance for ultimately succeeding to the presidency. (Page 4)	25X1 25X1
	Watch Committee Conclusions: The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future. Within and without Iraq, political groups continue to maneuver for power, and an attempt to assassinate Qasim could occur at any time.	25X1
25X1	25X1	25X6
	No	
		25X1

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Belgian Congo: Intermittent tribal warfare in the Congo interior has led to the proclamation of a state of emergency in the Luluabourg area, where over 110 Africans have been killed in the past three months. Belgian authorities have refused to recognize an agreement between two warring tribes, under which one of the two agreed to evacuate some 100,000 persons from disputed land. Although local security forces are attempting to disarm the opposing tribesmen prior to any new outbreaks, the intervention of Belgian authorities in the dispute may have compromised their status as mediators. During the current round-table talks with Congolese nationalists in Brussels, Belgian spokesmen may cite such violence as demonstrating a need for Belgian security forces even after a grant of autonomy.

III. THE WEST

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DAILY BRIEF

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Khrushchev Realigns Top Command

The firing of party presidium member Nikolay Belyayev on 19 January as party chief in Kazakhstan is the latest of recent signs of a significant reshuffling of Khrushchev's top command. The circle of top leaders around Khrushchev now is smaller than at any time since he consolidated his power. In view of the complex tasks facing the Soviet leadership, Khrushchev may soon find it expedient to bring some new faces into the ranks of his top advisers.

At the party central committee meeting in December, Khrushchev charged Belyayev with poor leadership in organizing the harvest in Kazakhstan and accused him of 'lacking the courage' to admit his errors. Factional infighting might also have been involved. Nikolay Rodionov, former party chief in Leningrad and a protegé of presidium member Premier Frol Kozlov, was named second secretary in the Kazakh party shuffle, suggesting that Kozlov had a hand in Belyayev's downfall. Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Kazakh premier, replaced Belyayev as first secretary. The Soviet announcement made no mention of a new post for Belyayev, probably indicating that he is not to be given an important job.

Belyayev's ouster follows the demotion last week of presidium member Aleksey Kirichenko, who had been second-incommand in the professional party machine, to party chief in Rostov Oblast. While events of the past few weeks have not reflected adversely on other members of the presidium, Nikolay Shvernik, 72, who is frequently sick, and Otto Kuusinen, 78, have apparently had little real influence for quite some time. Candidate member Yan Kalnberzin's transfer in November 1959 from Latvian party chief to the ceremonial post of chairman of the presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet signaled his loss of status.

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Opposition Candidate May Withdraw From South Korean	
Presidential Election	25X1
Syngman Rhee's opponent in South Korea's presidential	
election this spring, Cho Pyong-ok of the Democratic party,	
may be forced to withdraw from the race for reasons of health.	051/0
neattn.	- 25X6
Since there is no other opposition leader of Cho's political	
stature, his withdrawal would facilitate Rhee's re-election	
and enable the administration to make less use of repressive and illegal election tactics.	
and megal election factics.	
The Democratic vice-presidential candidate, incumbent	
Chang Myon, may become his party's presidential nominee if	
Cho withdraws. However, he may remain in second place in the belief that he would win again against National Assembly	
Speaker Yi Ki-pung and that this would give him the best chance	
for ultimately succeeding 84-year-old President Rhee. The	
death of the popular Democratic presidential candidate on the	
eve of the 1956 election generated wide popular sympathy for	
the party and contributed to Chang's election as vice president that year?	
(If Chang remains a candidate for the vice presidency, the	
administration may increase its pressures for a constitutional	
amendment stipulating that the president and vice president must belong to the same party. Such an amendment, if passed prior	· ·
to the election, would assure the election of Rhee's relatively	
unpopular running mate,	
	25X1
Chang appears to have considerably less popu-	
lar support than Cho and lacks his political courage. Many of	
Cho's followers might withdraw from the party rather than accept Chang's leadership.	25X1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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